April 1968 (Narrative, map and pictures)

B Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry

(This ends my recap of 50 years ago in Vietnam with the Triple Deuce) April 1, 1968: 26 days and a wake-up—Deros. Short!! But still in the Field. Looking at getting out of the field on April 21st

The Company begins the month Opcon to the 1st Brigade, 25th Division operating in the area northeast and east of Trang Bang and along the Saigon River. The missions are both road security and search and destroy. The Battalion is also tasked to provide one Platoon for convoy and road security from Tay Ninh to Bau Co and staying at night at Bau Co for security. The Companies and Recon rotated the mission

Map April 1968 AO

As Company Commander, I stayed in one position while the Platoons are conducting the search and destroy mission. Have two Platoons out and hold one Platoon for security and reaction force. The Weapons Platoon is also with me for fire support. On road security I position the Command Group (My Track, and the maintenance track with the Weapons Platoon in the center of area of responsibility) while the other Platoons run the road and outpost along the MSR.

On April 6, 1968, B Company is conducting searching operations along the banks of the Saigon River. LTC Coffman is flying over our area of operations along the river spots 3 sampans moving towards the west bank of the river. He instructs me to move to that location and conduct a search along the river bank. I move the Company to the location and send one Platoon upriver and one Platoon downriver.

Talk about doing something dumb. This day April 6, 1968, I did the dumbest thing during my life. How could 8 men be so stupid? In looking back at this over the years, I think how lucky the 8 of us were that day.

In searching along the bank, the 1st Platoon finds a sampan. I make a decision to get into the sampan along with the rest of the command group. The Command group is myself, my two RTO’s the Artillery FO and his two RTO, plus two me from the 1st Platoon. The command group gets into the sampan to look for bunkers from the water. We moved out, staying within ten meters of the bank. We moved along the bank line for about 50 meters, when a VC surfaced between the sampan and riverbank. He surfaced just 5 feet from the sampan. The RTO, sitting in the front, sees the VC break the surface of the water fires his M16. He empties the magazine into the VC driving him back to the bank. It was lucky that he did not tip the sampan. The VC must of thought VC’s were in the sampans.

The Sampan Excursion

Three VC Captured at the River

After this, we all decided the best place to be is on dry land. We move the sampan to the riverbank and get back on dry land. The 1st Platoon finds a bunker entrance, inside the bunker are two females and one male. We are able to get them out and find five hundred pounds of rice in bags. The company continued to search the area for the next two hours, 5 additional bunkers are found, all containing foodstuffs. The supplies are taken back to the APC’s and airlifted back to the base camp. The Company destroys three sampans.

On the 8th of April, the company is assigned to secure the MSR and operating away from the Battalion.

On April 9th, the Battalion is placed back under control of the 3rd Brigade. The Battalion is given a new mission. Early on the morning of April 9, Company B is directed to move and link up with the Battalion located north of Trang Bang. The Battalion will them move to the junctions of TLT 13 and 243 northeast of the Black Virgin. North of the Soui Da Special Forces Camp, the Battalion will establish and night position and sent patrols out. The next day, the Battalion will continue movement on TLT 13 to the junction with 244. The Battalion will then move north of 244 and set up a Battalion size patrol base.

Once the 2nd Battalion is in position off 244, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry under command of LTC Flint, will be air lifted to a clear area 2800 meters south of the junction of TLT 13 and 244. The 3rd Battalion will be landing in the LZ at mid-day on April 11th and will begin sweeping to the north to the 2nd Battalion who will be in a blocking position.

On April 9th, at 1030 hours, B Company meets up with the Battalion, and the Battalion moves out. The order of march is A Company, B Company, Battalion Command Group with Recon, and C Company. The Battalion moves without incidents to Soui Da area and establishes its night position and sends out the patrols. Recon is sent to the bridge over the Soui Ba Hao to secure for the movement of the Battalion the next day.

On April 10th, The Battalion moves out of its night position to continue to the location of the blocking positions on 244. The Battalion order of march is C Company, B Company, Command Group, and A Company to the bridge over the Sanh Doi without any problems. The jungle on both sides of the road had been cleared back for about 100 meters to a point 4000 meters east of where the road makes a sharp right turn. C and B Companies cross the bridge and advances along the road for about 1000 meters when C Company received 5 to 7 rounds of sniper fire. C Company returns the fire to the south. The LTC Coffman orders both C and B Companies to pull back while artillery and airstrikes are called in on the contact area.

Both companies pull back to the bridge and hold in place for over an hour while the air- strikes and artillery rake the area. The LTC Coffman then ordered both companies to move out again. The companies are able to move to the point where they received the sniper fire, when again, the lead platoon received and additional 3-5 rounds fired at its lead APC. Company C returned fire, and the Company Commander requested permission to continue its movement, but the LTC Coffman refuses, and has the companies pull back again. Another hour is wasted before both companies move out again.

The time is now approximately 1430 hours, and the Battalion is nowhere near getting to its blocking position. LTC Coffman orders the Companies to move out again. This time the lead APC gets 500 meters to the east of the point of sniper fire and the lead APC hits a mine. The damage is light, just blowing the track off. The explosion does not cause any injuries. However, this is another delay for the Battalion. It takes another hour to repair the APC and get moving.

The lead APC gets to the trail junction that is 4000 meters to the west of 244 without further incident. The time is now approximately 1700 hours, and the battalion is stretched out on TLT 13. The LTC Coffman orders the Battalion to halt, form a defensive position is the vicinity of the C Company. The laager is a rectangle shaped tied into the tree line at each side of the road. Each Company sends out ambush patrols and LP.

The Battalion will move out are first light to move to its objective. Later in the evening of April 10, the LTC Coffman calls the Company Commanders together to discuss the mission of the next day, and what happened today. None of the Company Commanders where happy with the location and shape of the night position. Too close to the tree line. All the Company Commanders agreed when C Company received the sniper fire, LTC Coffman should not have pulled the Battalion back. He should have let C Company return fire and direct the airstrikes and artillery onto the target and continue the advance. With the tree line cut so far back, there was little chance that any serious ambush could happen. The pulling back just delayed the Battalion and put it in a bad defensive position for the night.

At first light on April 11th the Battalion moves out with the same order of march as the day before. The move to new laager west of 244 was made without incident. As we made the turn off TLT 13 north on 244, we passed the two burned out APC’s of the 2nd Platoon, B Company that were destroyed on May 17, 1967.

The Battalion was in its laager position (Vicinity of 452665) at 1315 hours, LTC Coffman has A and C Companies to search out to the northeast and northwest from this position. B Company remained in the laager for security.

Later in the day, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry is airlifted into the area south of our Battalion operational area, to conduct company size operations. At 1600 hours, all Companies of the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry closed into on night laager. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry set up their night laager position (449609) south of the 22nd Battalion at a distance of approximately 6000 meters.

(244 ran north south would provide a direct route the 3rd Battalion. Once you hit the junction of TLT 13 and 244, there is a small trail leading south into the clearing where the 3rd Battalion is located. This trail is just wide enough for one APC.)

At the laager of the 2nd Battalion, each Company is directed to send out a Platoon size ambush patrol in front of their sector, and to establish listening post. At 1900 hours, the three ambush patrols departed the Battalion laager. By 1930 hours, all three patrols had established their ambush positions. The listening posts are in position about 100 meters in front of the companies. 3 to 5 men manned each listening post. The listening post have both radio and land line communications.

Map April 9-11, 1968

On April 12, 1968 (Good Friday) at approximately 0230 hours, the 3rd Battalion reported receiving incoming mortar rounds. Five minutes later, the 3rd Battalion reported the mortar fire increasing, and their units on the south of the perimeter are receiving small arms fire. Around 0300 hours the Brigade Commander alerts the 2nd Battalion to be prepared to move to the assistance of the 3rd Battalion on order. The LTC Coffman called for his Company Commanders and 10 minutes later briefs the commanders. If the Battalion was ordered to move out, the order of march would be C Company, followed by B Company, the Battalion command group with Recon, and the rear would be A Company. LTC Coffman directed that no action was to be taken at this time.

As I left the Battalion CP, I was walking with CPT Allison. CPT Allison told me he was not going to wait for LTC Coffman to tell him to recall the ambush patrols. If the order was given to move to support, then we needed to be ready to move. I told him I would do the same. He also told me to monitor the Brigade radio net, as he was doing to follow the action. I got back to the command track and recalled the ambush patrol. I keep the LP in position.

Around 0315 hours, the 2nd Battalion received incoming mortar rounds. The Battalion was hit by at least 12 rounds. The 4.2 mm mortars of the Battalion fired counter mortar fire, silencing the mortars.

At 0315 hours, the 3rd Battalion was still receiving mortar fire, and small arms fire, but the volume had not increased. The situation was still under control. The ambush patrols of B and C Companies had closed the laager. LTC Coffman was not informed that the patrols of B and C Company had been recalled.

At 0400 hours, the 3rd Battalion reported that it was now under ground attack. The VC/ NVA were attacking from the south and southwest. Artillery and air support were sup- porting the 3rd Battalion. At 0415 hours, the 3rd Battalion reported that two of its positions in the south had been overrun, and that the Recon Platoon, acting as the Battalion reaction force has been committed to the holes in the perimeter. It was estimated that there was at least a company size enemy force attacking the 3rd Battalion. LTC Flint requested that the Brigade Commander commit the 2nd Battalion to move to support the 3rd Battalion. It was estimated that it would take the 2nd Battalion at least 2 hours to reach the 3rd Battalion, and that was if there were no attempts to block the 2nd Battalion.

At 0400 hours A Company ambush patrol engages unknown number of VC/NVA with small arms and claymores. VC/NVA return fire with 60mm mortars. A Company suffers 3 KIA and 3 WIA. Five VC/NVA are KIA.

At 0430 hours the Brigade Commander committed the 2nd Battalion to move to reinforce the 3rd Battalion. LTC Coffman gives the order to pull in the patrols and LP. The order of march was as it was outlined by the LTC Coffman in his briefing. LTC Coffman asked how long before the units were ready to move. CPT Allison replied: “Fullback 6, this is Charlie 6, moving out now”. I responded: “Fullback 6, this is Bravo 6, following Charlie 6” Within 3 minutes of receiving the command to move out, both C and B Companies were moving. Once LTC Coffman realized that B and C Companies were moving and the last element of B Company cleared laager, he directed A Company to join the Battalion once it recovers its ambush patrol WIA’s and KIA’s. LTC Coffman directed the Command Group with Recon move out to link up with B Company.

A Company would be ready to move in 20-30 minutes. If Bravo and Charlie would have waited for LTC Coffman order to pull in patrols, it would have been another 30-45 minutes before we would have been able to move.

The order of march for B Company was with the 3rd Platoon in the lead, followed by the Command group, 2nd Platoon, Weapons Platoon, and 1st Platoon. The Battalion movement would be mounted until it met any type of enemy contact. Both C and B Companies were on the 244 heading south, with the speed of the movement ranging between 3-5 miles per hours. The lead platoon would stop ever so often to Recon the area to the front; they would do this with their night vision devices, and with dismounting the troops. This did slow the Battalion’s movement.

At 0600 hours, the lead APC crosses highway 13, and was about 1200 meters from the position of the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion reported VC/NVA inside the perimeter, and it was estimated that the Battalion had over 50 men wounded. The enemy fire was concentrated to the south and southwest of the Battalion, and C Company of the 3rd Battalion was hard pressed to hold its positions.

As B Company approached the junction, the I recalled the contact of May 17 & 18, 1967. The two burned out APC’s of the 2nd Platoon were still there, a haunting sign of the time. It was not a pleasant memory, and with just a few days left in the field, a cold chill came over me. The Company kept moving and was waiting for additional information on the status of the 3rd Battalion.

C Company was now within 200 meters of the 3rd Battalion. There were no signs that the VC/NVA had any troops committed to the north of the battalion. This surprised us, no effort was made to block our movement from the laager position. The CPT Allison requested information and direction. LTC Coffman directed both the B and C go to the 3rd Battalion radio net and get directions from the 3rd Battalion Commander. The LTC Flint directed C Company to move straight through the Battalion area to the south and deliver a high volume of fire on the tree line to the south and eliminate any VC/NVA inside the perimeter as they move west. LTC Flint said that he would have guides to lead the Companies in the perimeter.

LTC Flint wanted B Company to follow C Company into the perimeter and move to the west to clear out the perimeter and to bring their fire on the tree line in that direction. Once in the perimeter, I put the 2nd and 3rd platoons on line as they moved to the gap in the line that separated C and A Companies of the 3rd Battalion. The company moved to the perimeter and started laying down a heavy volume of fire with the 50-cal machine guns. The troops dismounted and began firing their personal weapon and pushed 10-15 meters pass the 3rd Battalions positions. The time was now 00620 hours. The company continued firing until it receives orders from the battalion to cease fire, which came at 0645 hours. All contact ended by 0730.

With the perimeter secured, I got out of my track and walked the perimeter checking on the Company. I also walked to look at the VC/NVA bodies within the perimeter. The VC/NCA penetrated the perimeter and the men of the 3rd Battalion regrouped and fought and reestablished the perimeter as the 2nd Battalion approached.

The 3rd Battalion was now having the dust-offs come in to evacuate the wounded. The Brigade Commander came into the perimeter and met with both of the Battalion Commanders. It was determined that the 2nd Battalion should move out and attempt to establish contact with the enemy. The plan was to have C Company push to the south and B Company to push to the west with A Company to push to the northeast. All Companies move out dismounted, leaving the tracks in the perimeter. The Companies started their movement at 0800 hours. They were instructed to move, and if they did not establish contact with the enemy within 2500 meters, that they were to hold, and move back to the perimeter on order.

Company B moved out with its platoons in column, with the 2nd Platoon in the lead, followed by the Command Group, 3rd Platoon, and the 1st Platoon. The Weapons Platoon remained in the perimeter. The company moved to its stop line, held in place for the next hour, and waited for instructions. LTC Coffman directed the company to move 500 -700 meters to the north and then to head back to the perimeter. On the way back to the perimeter, the Company finds one VC/NVA KIA.

During the sweep C Company engages two VC/NVA resulting in two VC/NVA KIA, they also find one M-16 rifle and one 90mm recoilless rifle. Company B closed the perimeter at 1400 hours. The 2nd Battalion established a perimeter, and it was used to airlift the 3rd Battalion out of the area. The 2nd Battalion would remain in the area and conduct searching operations.

During this battle, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry lost 16 men killed with 49 wounded. The body count for the enemy was over 150. The 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry had no additional wounded after the three men that were killed in the mortar attack.

During the following 6 days, the Battalion conducted both Platoon and Company sized operations with A and C Companies having heavy contact during this time. (A Company had 6 KIA’s and C Company had 1 KIA). Although B Company conducted several patrols during time, we did not make any contact while finding trenches and bunkers. This was my last tactical operation during my first tour.

Map April 12, 1968

Map April 12-13, 1968

Sketch of April 13, 1968

On April 20, 1968, I gave up command of B Company, 2nd Battalion, (M), 22nd Infantry, and departed the Company on the last chopper out to return to the Battalion base camp at Dau Tieng. I remained in the base camp for 4 days, and then went to Long Binh and departed for the states two days later.

KIA Jose Antonio Marrero-Rios, 4-21-1968 Gene Covey, 4-21-1968

The last official duty I had was the letter to the parents of SP4 Gene Covey who was killed in action on April 21, 1968.

In all the contact I was in, both the light and the heavy, I did not fire my weapon. It was my belief (Whether it was right or wrong) if I was firing my weapon, I was not providing the leadership to the troops. I had to stay in a position that would provide me with the best opportunity to observe, lead, and direct. To see and understand what was happening, to provide the information to my commander and directions to squads and platoons. To call in and direct the fire support, whether it be artillery, gunships, or air strikes. If I was firing my weapon, then I was not doing my job.

During my time as a Platoon Leader, I lost one man to enemy fire and one man to friendly artillery. The platoon had a total of 4 men wounded. As Company Commander the Company had limited contact with no causalities.

I departed Vietnam on a flight landing at Travis Air Force Base outside of Sacramento, CA. As we approached the coast of California, we flew over the Golden Gate Bridge, at that point I knew I was home.

I returned to the States to see Mary and Candy and reported to our next duty station in Omaha, NB as the advisor to the Nebraska and South Dakota Army Reserve. Besides advising the reserve units, I was the Notification Officer and Survivors Assistance Officer for soldiers lost in Vietnam. This duty was the hardest duty I ever had. I made multiple notifications and was the Assistance Office for several families.

I stayed in Omaha until I received orders for my second tour of Vietnam in September 1969. I would join the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division. I would command B Company, take over as the Battalion S-4, and later command HHC. The experiences, lessons learned, and outstanding leaders I served with in the Triple Deuce enable me to provide the leadership to B Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry. To survive 6 months in command and not losing a man and inflicting damage to the enemy.

Our area of operations looks a lot different now. Most of it covered by a Lake Dau Tieng. You can take a sightseeing cruise on the lake or a cable car to the top of Nui Ba Den.

Dau Tieng in the modern day, 2017

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